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Sociologia, Apropriação e Emergência

December 29, 2008 Leave a comment

Esse post é UMA RESPOSTA SEM NECESSIDADE A: BOURDIEU, Pierre. Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984.

Sobre  Distinction – uma entrevista com Bourdieu.

Texto Base dessa rápida reflexão: Those Things That Hold Us Together: Taste and Sociology
Publicado em 2007.
Autor: Antoine Hennion – École des Mines de Paris, France.
Referência: HENNION, Antoinne. Those things that hold us together: taste and sociology. Cultural Sociology. London: Sage. n. 1, p. 97-114, 2007.

“There is co-formation. Differences emerge, multiply and are projected. The ‘object’ is not an immobile mass against which our goals are thrown. (…) Taste is not an attribute, it is not a property (of thing or of a person), it is an activity. Tastes are not given or determined, and their objects are not either; (…) The meticulous activity of  amateurs is a machinery to bring forth through contact and feel differences infinitely multiplying, multiplying indissociably ‘within’ the objects tasted and ‘within’ the taster’s sensitivity. These differences ar not ‘already there’. (…) to taste is to make feel, and to make oneself feel, and so, by the sensations of the body, exactly like the climber, to feel oneself doing.” (HENNION, 2007, p. 101).

“We cannot continue to oscillate indefinitely between linear interpretations, that is, ‘natural’ ones – taste comes from things themselves – and circular interpretations, that is ‘cultural’ ones – objects are what we make tham – in this strange zero sum equation between objects and society. By showing how taste comes to things thanks to the amateurs, we fully rejoin pragmatism. Pragmatism made us give up the dual world – things on one side autonomous but inert, things on the other side, pure social signs – so as to enter a world of mediations and effects, in which the body that tastes and the taste of the object, the group that loves it and the range of things they love, are produced together, one by the other. The attachments link all these heterogeneuos elements, at once determinant and determined, that carry constraints and make the course of things rebound.” (HENNION, 2007, p. 112-114).

O texto que menciono aqui, de Antoine Hennion, trata de um assunto que despertou meu interesse de imediato. Há poucos meses havia acrescentado ao meu del.icio.us um post que fazia comentários sobre o livro de Pierre Bourdieu. Achei muito espirituosa a questão de gosto ser determinado por categorias, condições, regiões, classes sociais e outros ‘containers’.

Breve tempo depois me deparei com o texto de Hennion que também tratava do gosto, mas de maneira mais geral, através de uma visão ‘dessas coisas todas que nos cercam’ e apresentado o ponto de vista dos amadores, ou seja pessoas cuja atenção é absorvida por aquilo que lhes desperta, de alguma forma, a paixão. A idéia da paixão, da experimentação e principalmente da relação como algo capaz de despertar preferências a respeito do que nos cerca pareceu-me bem mais interessante que o julgamento do gosto como deferido pela condição histórica ou social em que nos encontramos.

Especialmente a questão dos amadores e aqui a palavra permanece no seu original em francês ‘amateurs’ que vai além do sentido de observar pessoas que não são profissionais em suas atividades, mas abrange aqueles que lidam com determinado tema ou domínio sob diferentes graus de entendimento e sensibilidade. O texto de Hennion passou a ser interessante por tratar do gosto através de que ele é, um movimento de experimentação e reflexão, cuja ação parte do ponto zero, sem hierarquias, nem pré-determinações. Essa ação se encontra subjugada por uma repetição intríseca ao ator, que não poderia nunca ser socialmente generalizada. Uma repetição cujas condições, na verdade, são bem ‘gostos’ pessoais.

Exemplo: “- Você curte algum tipo de esporte?”

“- Sim, gosto de correr.”

“- Como vc pratica essa atividade, ou melhor, como vc curte praticar essa atividade? ”

“- Gosto de correr, de preferência, de madrugada lá pelas 5:30 da manhã,  no percurso que eu planejei que termina no bosque. E gosto sobretudo de correr em madrugadas de dias nos quais o tempo será bom e sem muito vento;  pois, gosto de ver o sol nascendo ao final da corrida”.

Para os amadores a questão do processo pelo qual a experimentação acontece é extremamente importante, é a repetição ideal que faz a experiência interessante. Sem o processo não ocorre absorção da atenção.

Outro ponto relevante na construção de Hennion é a reflexividade e participação dos objetos no processo de construção do gosto. É como se eles quase não existissem antes de nossa experimentação e, na verdade, realmente não existem para nós, apenas fazem parte de um repertório geral de nosso conhecimento. Mas o gosto vem de uma interação entre o objeto e o ator sem distinção ou privilégios de posição.

A questão dos amadores a meu ver é fundamental para o estudo das novas tecnologias e o seu constante processo de inovação. Fico pensando nas possibilidades geradas por nossa realidade comunicacional proveniente de ferramentas da web 2.0 e observo que, nesse caso, somos todos amadores, apaixonados pelos temas ou idéias que ‘curtimos’ e na Internet emergimos enquanto grupos e atores capazes de apropriar das ferramentas disponíveis, organizando e  compartilhando seus  ‘gostos’. Sem as fronteiras da nacionalidade ou condição social.

Acho que aqui está uma inovação e uma tendência, de que o gosto se movimente para além de suas antigas identidades nacionais e seja móvel na rede. A rede, como sempre, trouxe muitos espaços para que nós amadores pudéssemos extrapolar…

Segue abaixo um trecho do filme Le Fabuleux Destin de Amélie Poulain (2001),  a parte em que o narrador descreve o gosto de cada personagem, (isso é muito interessante!):

Breve resumo do texto de Hennion com alguns excertos, para quem não tiver acesso:

Abstract: The idea of reflexivity has much to offer to the analysis of taste – but reflexivity in its ancient sense, a form neither active nor passive, pointing to an originary state where things, persons, and events have just arrived, with no action, subject or objects yet decided. Objects of taste are not present, inert, available and at our service. They give themselves up, they shy away, they impose themselves. ‘Amateurs’ do not believe things have taste. On the contrary, they make themselves detect taste is no longer considered ( as with so-called ‘critical’ sociology) an arbitrary election which has to be explained by hidden social causes. Rather, it is a collective technique, whose analysis helps us to understand the ways we make ourselves sensitized, to things, to ourselves, to situations and to moments, while simultaneously controlling how those feelings might be shared and discussed with others.

“Although amateurs sopposedly feel a natural affinity towards the objects of their passion, sociology has persisted in showing that this relationship is actually socially constructed through the categories employed, the authority of leaders, the imitation of intimates, institutions and frames of appreciations, as well as through the social game of identity making and differentiation.” (HENNION, 2007, p. 97).

“In fact, ‘amateurs’ do no believe things have taste. To the contrary, they bring themselves to detect the taste of things through a continuour elaboration of prcedures that put taste to the test. (…) What could be simpler?” (HENNION, 2007, p. 98).

“(…) the only important thing for a moment, for humans thogether like this, is common practice. (…) – it is the activity that defines, not the inverse. (…) For everuthing which the theory of action emphasizes – the subject, the goal, the plan – is of no importance. All that matters, to the contrary, is precisely what theory of action places in aninstrumental position: gestures, holds, movements, passages – all the words between the two, (…) A ‘movement’ (…)” (HENNION, 2007, p. 99).

“There is co-formation. Differences emerge, multiply and are projected. The ‘object’ is not an immobile mass against which our goals are thrown. (…) Taste is not an attribute, it is not a property (of thing or of a person), it is an activity. Tastes are not given or determined, and their objects are not either; (…) The meticulous activity of amateurs is a machinery to bring forth through contact and feel differences infinitely multiplying, multiplying indissociably ‘within’ the objects tasted and ‘within’ the taster’s sensitivity. These differences ar not ‘already there’. (…) to taste is to make feel, and to make oneself feel, and so, by the sensations of the body, exactly like the climber, to feel oneself doing.” (HENNION, 2007, p. 101).

“Taste as a situated activity is not so pre- established: it points tword the contact, a situation of ‘between-the-two’, the place and the moment of the uncertain upsurge of sensation.”(HENNION, 2007, p. 101).

“Amateurs do not struggle against determinisms that the sociologist unveils despite their resistance. Amateurs cope with determinisms. (…) amateurs do not deny social determinisms, they rather rely on them, as they do masterpieces or on the tastes of others, to ‘determine’ their own tastes. (…) Otherwise stated, the more determinants there are, the more preferences exist, and not the inverse.” (HENNION, 2007, 102 e 103).

” This moment marks itself by the surge of an intensified contact, provoking a shift between the self towards the object, and a shift of the object towards the self. What the minimal word ‘attention’ express so lightly and so well – in a single movement, like the taster’s gesture – these two displacements which make contact, grant attention to, capture the attention of.
Yet, this minimum implies such a great  deal. In ther first place, reflexivity on the part of the taster. (…) And, on the part of objects, it implies a capacity to interrupt, to surprise or to respond. This right to advance, this is their reflexivity, their power to make themselves more present. Objects ar not already there, inert and avaiable at our service. They deliver themselves, unrobe themselves, impose themselves on us. (…) beautiful things only offer themselves to those who offer themselves to beautiful things.” (HENNION, 2007, p. 105-106).

“We cannot continue to oscillate indefinitely between linear interpretations, that is, ‘natural’ ones – taste comes from things themselves – and circular interpretations, that is ‘cultural’ ones – objects are what we make tham – in this strange zero sum equation between objects and society. By showing how taste comes to things thanks to the amateurs, we fully rejoin pragmatism. Pragmatism made us give up the dual world – things on one side autonomous but inert, things on the other side, pure social signs – so as to enter a world of mediations and effects, in which the body that tastes and the taste of the object, the group that loves it and the range of things they love, are produced together, one by the other. The attachments link all these heterogeneuos elements, at once determinant and determined, that carry constraints and make the course of things rebound.” (HENNION, 2007, p. 112-114).

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I could sing of your love, forever…Delirious?

December 28, 2008 Leave a comment
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The morality of the links

December 10, 2008 Leave a comment

WEINBERGER, David. The morality of the links. In: TUROW, Joseph; LOKMAN, Tsui. (Ed.) The hyperlinked society: questioning connections in the digital age. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2008.

Neste artigo, Weinberger pensa a moralidade dos links (se são bons ou ruins) não do ponto de vista do conteúdo a que nos levam, mas da própria arquitetura de compartilhamento da Web. Conclui que a Web apresenta um processo sempre moral de relacionamento e experimentação uma vez que compartilhamos nossos espaços e estamos sempre em processo de conversação, sempre em uma relação fruto dessa experiência. Sendo assim temos que atentar para como o outro se encontra no mundo, seus valores e compartilhar esses valores, aprendendo a negociar com eles.

A preocupação com a moral em rede é fruto de uma pesquisa que realizei com jovens de 15 a 19 anos no Programa Conexões Científicas – 2008, na qual notei que questões como o falso e verdadeiro estão adquirindo um aspecto híbrido e produtor de subjetividade através de suas conversações na Internet.

ABOUT THE BOOK

“The essays in this collection engage these questions and others in their attempts to undestand the social meaning of the hyperlink. The project started as a conference called “The Hyperlinked Society” that I convened at the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication on Friday, June 9, 2006. Whith the suport of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foudation and the Annenberg Public Policy Center, about two hundred people from around the United States as wellas Canada, China, the Netherlands, Israel, Autralia, Germany, and England came together to address the social implications of instant digital linking. The guiding assumption of the meeting was that we need crossdisciplinary thinking to do justice to this multifaceted subject. Our panelists therefore included renowned news, entertainment, and marketing executives; information architects, bloggers; carthographers; audience anlysts; and communication researchers.

(…)the goal was to shed light on a remakable social phenomenon that peple in business and the academy usually take for granted.” (página 7).

WEINBERGER’S ARTICLE: The morality of the links

“We could perform an analysis of those links to get a sense of what sort of conections they’re drawing. If the vast majority of them are embede in text that consists of variations on “I hate that other site!” then may belief that links are good might be shaken, especially if the pages hosting those links were the most popular ones. But that’s an unlikely outcome.

Besides – and more important – the goodness of links comes not from the quality of the pages they point to or the semantic contexts in which they’re embeded. The goodness of links operates a level below that. So even if all the links on the Web were negative and hateful, I think I’d say not that links are bad but there’s something very nasty about us human beings.(…)

Our moral behavior and our ability to engage in moral argument are grounded in the same facts. You can’t be moral if you don’t recognize that there are other people with interests (…) You’re just a rule follower. To be a moral person – as you an I and just about everyone we know are – you have to be aware not only that there are others but that they care about what happens to them. (…) to care about the world the way that person’s does.” (WEINBERGER, 2008, p. 185).

“What counts is seeing how the world matters to the other person.” (página 186). (The effects of our action).

O cuidado sobre as possibilidades de influências e as suas conseqüências é o coração da moralidade. Sem esse sentimento a moralidade torna-se apenas um conjunto de regras. “With it, the rules become rules of thumb we only consult when we have trouble sorting out the jumbled ways our actions matter. ” (página 186).

“The Golden Rule that the possibility of morality itself depends on three fundamental facts: we share a world, that world matter to others, and the fact that it matters to others matters to us. If we remove any one of these three facts, the world isn’t moral in any way we cam recognize. (…) Put these three facts together and we live in a world in which our behavior is constrained because what whe do affects others who also care about what happens to them.” (página 186).

“I want to see if there is anything about the structure and nature of links themselves that let us say rasonable that links are good. Or, to be more exact, is there anything about their structure and nature that explains why at least some of us (I, for example) have a strong sense that links are good. (186).

“There is. If morality is based on our caring that we share a world with others whom that world matters, then is acting morally, we turn tword that world with others.” (186-187).

“We sometimes make progress in morality by feeling the feelings of others, but we make more significant progress by understanding how the world appears such that it evokes feelings. Sympathetic understanding is more powerful than mere empathy because it gets at more of the truth. (…) They merely sum up an event saturated with particularities. Our moral sense can go as deep as the world itself in understanding how things matter to affect us. (…) In this sense, then, morality is an infrastructure of connection in which we allow ourselves to care about how the world matters to others. That is formally the same as a description of the link structure of the Web.

After all, what do  we do on the Web? We link. No links, no Web. In liking we send people to another site (assuming we aren’t the sort of narcissists who link only to themselves). Where they can see a bit of the world as it appears to another. (…) Pointing people to a shared world, letting how it matters to others matter to us – that’s the essence of morality and of linking” (página 187).

“Morality and the Web have the same basic architecture? (…) That means the Web is the same as morality. Surely the web can’t be that important.” (…) the moral realm is not an isolated segment of human experience”. (página 188).

“Web’s moral structure is in the Web. There is something special, but not unique, about the Web’s moral architecture. The tools by which we communicate tend to reflect the moral architecture more explicity (…) because communication with each other, we turn toward the word that we share and that matters to both of us. I try to show you how the world matters to me, attempt to understand how it matters to you, and we try to share more of the world. In communicating.” (189).

Redes – Coletivos

December 2, 2008 Leave a comment

“Com Latour, a ciência e a técnica são concebidas,
assim como qualquer outra entidade, como emergentes
de um coletivo heterogêneo, de um híbrido de homens
e coisas. A noção de sociedade como reunião de
indivíduos é frontalmente rejeitada, uma vez que esta
é composta não apenas de indivíduos, mas de uma
infinidade de materiais heterogêneos. Para o autor,
somente algumas sociedades animais, como a dos
babuínos – primatas que possuem apenas o próprio
corpo como dispositivo de intervenção social -, podem
se prestar à definição acima5. Embora haja distinções
entre os materiais, Callon e Law advertem que todos
são essenciais na dinâmica do coletivo, afirmando que
“todos esses materiais contribuem à criação e à
transformação da ordem social” (Callon & Law, 1997,
p. 101).
Toda entidade é uma rede, e todas as entidades
são co-extensivas e indiscerníveis das redes de que
participam. Os autores concluem que Pasteur, assim
como qualquer outro cientista ou engenheiro, é “uma
rede de relações associando uma grande variedade de
elementos heterogêneos entre os quais ele traça um
compromisso” (Callon & Law, 1997, p. 103). Para
entender isto, basta acompanhar a gênese, o processo
de constituição dessas entidades, ao invés de
considerá-las já acabadas e com fronteiras firmemente
estabelecidas. Basta traçar seu processo de tradução,
entendido como o movimento que coloca os seres em
relação. Toda entidade é efeito de um processo de
composições e associações, cuja totalização é somente
aparente ou transitória.

Definir as entidades que compõem os coletivos
como redes significa defini-las como efeito de
processos de composições e associações que lhes
conferem formas sempre provisórias.

De: Psicologia em Estudo, Maringá, v. 10, n. 2, p. 295-304, mai./ago. 2005

Autoras: Liliana da Escóssia
Virgínia Kastrup